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This paper examines the extent to which various regions, and the world as a whole, could 
gain from multilateral trade reform over the next decade. The World Bank’s LINKAGE 
model of the global economy is employed to examine the impact first of current trade 
barriers and agricultural subsidies, and then of possible outcomes from the WTO’s Doha 
round. The results suggest moving to free global merchandise trade would boost real 
incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (and in Cairns Group countries) 
proportionately more than in other developing countries or high-income countries. Real 
returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes, would rise 
substantially in those developing country regions, thereby helping to reduce poverty. A 
Doha partial liberalization could take the world some way towards those desirable 
outcomes, but more so the more agricultural subsidies are disciplined and applied tariffs 
are cut, and the more not just high-income but also developing countries choose to 
engage in the process of reform.  
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Why all the fuss over agriculture? 
 
Agriculture is yet again causing contention in international trade negotiations. It 
caused long delays to the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s and 1990s, and it is again 
proving to be the major stumbling block in the World Trade Organization’s Doha round 
of multilateral trade negotiations (formally known as the Doha Development Agenda, or 
DDA). For example, it contributed substantially to the failure of the September 2003 
Trade Ministerial Meeting in Cancún to reach agreement on how to proceed with the 
DDA, after which it took another nine months before a consensus was reached on the 
Doha work program, otherwise referred to as the July Framework Agreement (WTO 
2004).  
It is ironic that agricultural policy is so contentious, given its small and declining 
importance in the global economy. The sector’s share of global GDP has fallen from 
around one-tenth in the 1960s to little more than one-thirtieth today. In developed 
countries the sector accounts for only 1.8 percent of GDP and only a little more of full-
time equivalent employment. Mirroring that decline, agriculture’s share of global 
merchandise trade has more than halved over the past three decades, dropping from 22 
percent to 9 percent. For developing countries its importance has fallen even more 
rapidly, from 42 to 11 percent (Figure 1).     2
Since policies affecting this declining sector are so politically sensitive, there are 
always self-interested groups suggesting it be sidelined in trade negotiations – as indeed 
it has in numerous sub-global preferential trading agreements, and was in the GATT prior 
to the Uruguay Round.
1 Today the groups with that inclination include not just farmers in 
the highly protecting countries and net food importing developing countries but also 
those food exporters receiving preferential access to those markets including holders of 
tariff rate quotas, members of regional trading agreements, and parties to non-reciprocal 
preference agreements including all least-developed countries. However, sidelining 
agriculture in the Doha round would do a major disservice to many of the world’s poorest 
people, namely those in farm households in developing countries. It is precisely because 
agricultural earnings are so important to a large number of developing countries that the 
highly protective farm policies of a few wealthy countries are being targeted by them in 
the WTO negotiations. Better access to rich countries’ markets for their farm produce is a 
high priority for them.
2 
Some developing countries have been granted greater access to developed-
country markets for a selection of products under various preferential agreements. 
Examples are the EU’s provisions for former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) program and more recently for Least Developed Countries under the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement. Likewise, the United States has its Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These 
schemes reduce demands for developed-country farm policy reform from preference-
receiving countries, but they exacerbate the concerns of other countries excluded from 
such programs and thereby made worse off through declining terms of trade – and they 
                                                 
1 The rules of the GATT are intended, in principle, to cover all trade in goods. However, in practice, trade 
in agricultural products was largely excluded from their remit as a consequence of a number of exceptions. 
Details are to be found in Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996) and in Anderson and Josling (2005). 
2 According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, 54 percent of the  economically active 
population is engaged in agriculture in developing countries, which is nearly five times larger than the 
sector’s measured GDP share (FAO 2004, Table A4). While some of that difference in shares is due to 
under-reporting of subsistence consumption, it nonetheless implies that these people on average are 
considerably less productive and hence poorer than those employed outside agriculture.     3
may even be worsening rather than improving aggregate global and even developing 
country welfare.  
Apart from that, many in developing countries feel they did not get a good deal 
out of the Uruguay Round. From a mercantilistic view, the evidence seems to support that 
claim: Finger and Winters (2002) report that the average depth of tariff cut by developing 
countries was substantially greater than that agreed to by high-income countries. As well, 
developing countries had to take on costly commitments such as those embodied in the 
SPS and TRIPS agreements (Finger and Schuler 2001). They therefore are determined in 
the Doha round that they get significantly more market access commitments from 
developed countries before they contemplate opening their own markets further.  
Greater market access for developing countries’ exporters, and especially for poor 
producers in those countries, is to be found in agriculture (and to a lesser extent in textiles 
and clothing). This can be seen from a glance at Table 1. It shows that developing 
country exporters face an average tariff (even after taking account of preferences) of 16 
percent for agriculture and food, and 9 percent for textiles and clothing, compared with 
just 2.5 percent for other manufactures. The average tariff on agricultural goods is high 
not just in high-income countries but also in developing countries, suggesting even more 
reason why attention should focus on that sector (along with textiles) in the multilateral 
reform process embodied in the DDA. 
If agriculture were to be ignored in the Doha negotiations, there is the risk that 
agricultural protection would start rising again. That is what happened throughout the 
course of industrial development in Europe and Northeast Asia (Anderson, Hayami and 
Others 1986, Lindert 1991). It was only with the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization, in 1995, that agricultural trade was brought under multilateral disciplines 
via the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  
That URAA was ambitious in scope, converting all agricultural protection to 
tariffs, and limiting increases in virtually all tariffs through tariff bindings. Unfortunately, 
the process of converting non-tariff barriers into tariffs (inelegantly termed 
“tariffication”) provided numerous opportunities for backsliding that greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of the agreed disciplines (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). In developing 
countries, the option for “ceiling bindings” allowed countries to set their bindings at high    4
levels, frequently unrelated to the previously prevailing levels of protection. Hence 
agricultural import tariffs are still very high in both rich and poor countries, with bound 
rates half as high again as MFN applied rates (Table 2). 
As well, agricultural producers in some countries are supported by export 
subsidies (still tolerated within the WTO only for agriculture) and by domestic support 
measures. Together with tariffs and other barriers to agricultural imports, these measures 
support farm incomes and encourage agricultural output to varying extents. The market 
price support component also typically raises domestic consumer prices of farm products. 
Figure 2 shows the value and the percentage of total farm receipts from these support 
policy measures, called the Producer Support Estimate or PSE by the OECD secretariat.
3 
For OECD members as a group, the PSE was almost the same in 2001-03 as in 1986-88, 
at about $240 billion per year. But because of growth in the sector, as a percentage of 
total farm receipts (inclusive of support) that represents a fall from 37 to 31 percent. 
Figure 2 also shows that there has been a significant increase in the proportion of that 
support coming from programs that are somewhat “decoupled” from current output such 
as payments based on area cropped, number of livestock, or some historical reference 
period.  
Agricultural protection levels remain very high in these developed countries, 
especially when bearing in mind that 1986-88 was a period of historically very low 
international food prices and hence above-trend PSEs. And, as Figure 3 shows, the PSEs 
have fallen least in the most-protective OECD countries. By contrast, tariff protection to 
OECD manufacturing has fallen over the past 60 years from a level similar to that for 
OECD agriculture today (above 30 per cent nominal rate of protection) to only one-tenth 
of that now. This means far more resources have been retained in agricultural production 
in developed countries – and hence fewer in developing countries – than would have been 
the case if protection had been phased down in both agriculture and manufacturing 
simultaneously.  
Nonetheless, the achievements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
provide some scope for optimism about what might be achieved via the WTO as part of 
                                                 
3 Until recently the PSE referred to the Producer Subsidy Equivalent. For more about the concept and its 
history, see Legg (2003).    5
the DDA and beyond. The current Doha round has the advantage over the Uruguay 
Round of beginning from the framework of rules and disciplines agreed in that previous 
Round. In particular, it has the three clearly identified “pillars” of market access, export 
subsidies, and domestic support on which to focus. True, it took more than three years to 
agree on a framework for the current negotiations, reached on at the end of July 2004 
(WTO 2004), but now that July Framework Agreement is likely to guide the negotiations 
for some time. It therefore provides a strong basis for undertaking ex ante analysis of 
various options potentially available to WTO members during the Doha negotiations.  
This paper summarizes a recent study (Anderson and Martin 2005) that builds on 
numerous analyses of the Doha Development Agenda and agricultural trade, including 
five very helpful books that appeared in 2004. One edited by Aksoy and Beghin (2004) 
provides details of trends in global agricultural markets and policies, especially as they 
affect nine commodities of interest to developing countries. Another, edited by Ingco and 
Winters (2004), includes a wide range of analyses based on papers revised following a 
conference held just prior to the aborted WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in Seattle in 
1999. The third, edited by Ingco and Nash (2004), provides a follow-up to the broad 
global perspective of the Ingco and Winters volume: it explores a wide range of key 
issues and options in agricultural trade reform from a developing country perspective.  
The fourth, edited by Anania, Bohman, Carter and McCalla (2004), is a comprehensive 
tenth-anniversary retrospective on the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture as well 
as a look ahead following also numerous unilateral trade and subsidy reforms in 
developed, transition and developing economies. And the fifth focuses on implications 
for Latin America (Jank 2004).  
All of those 2004 studies were completed well before the July Framework 
Agreement was reached in the early hours of 1 August 2004, and before the public 
release in December 2004 of the new Version 6 database of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) at Purdue University. That Version 6 database is a major improvement 
over the previous version for several reasons. One is that it includes global trade and 
protection data as of 2001 (previously 1997). Another is that protection data are 
available, for the first time, on bound as well as applied tariffs, non-reciprocal as well as 
reciprocal tariff preferences, the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs (which are    6
plentiful in the agricultural tariff schedules of many high-income, high-protection 
countries), and the effects of agricultural tariff rate quotas. In addition, key trade policy 
changes to the start of 2005 have been added for our analysis, namely, the commitments 
associated with accession to WTO by such economies as China and Taiwan (China), the 
implementation of the last of the Uruguay Round commitments (most notably the 
abolition of quotas on trade in textiles and clothing at the end of 2004), and the eastward 
enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members in April 2004.  
Hence what distinguishes the present study from the above 2004 studies and other 
books with similar titles is that (a) its ex ante analysis focuses on the core aspects of the 
July Framework Agreement from the viewpoint of agriculture and developing countries, 
taking account also of what might happen to non-agricultural market access and the other 
negotiating areas, and (b) it does so in an integrated way by using the new GTAP Version 
6 database (amended to account for key protection changes to early 2005) and the latest 
version of the World Bank’s global, economy-wide Linkage model, details of which are 
documented in van der Mensbrugghe (2004).
4 
 
What questions are addressed in this study? 
 
Among the core questions addressed in this study, following an intense program 
of integrated research during the latter half of 2004 by a complementary set of well-
informed scholars from four continents, are the following: 
•  What is at stake in this Doha round, in terms of efficiency gains foregone by the 
various regions of the world because of current tariffs and agricultural subsidies? 
                                                 
4 This analysis is vastly more sophisticated than the ex ante analyses undertaken for the Uruguay Round. At 
that time there were very few economy-wide global models, so primary reliance was on partial equilibrium 
models of world food markets (see, e.g., World Bank 1986, Goldin and Knudsen 1990, Tyers and Anderson 
1992); estimates of protection rates were somewhat cruder and less complete; and analysts grossly 
overestimated the gains because they did not anticipate that tariffication would be so “dirty” in the sense of 
creating large wedges between bound and MFN applied tariff rates, nor did they have reliable estimates of 
the tariff preferences enjoyed by developing countries or the ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. Some 
of these limitations also applied to ex post analyses of the Uruguay Round (see, e.g., Martin and Winters 
1996).    7
•  How much are each of the three “pillars” of agricultural distortions (market 
access, export subsidies and domestic support) contributing to those welfare 
losses, compared with non-agricultural trade barriers? 
•  How might the demands for Special and Differential Treatment for developing 
and least-developed countries be met without compromising the potential gains 
from trade expansion for those economies? 
•  What are the consequences, in terms of opening up to imports, of alternative 
formulas for cutting bound agricultural tariffs? 
•  In the case of products whose imports are subject to tariff rate quotas, what are the 
trade-offs between reducing in-quota or out-of-quota tariffs versus expanding the 
size of those quotas or the in-quota tariffs? 
•  To what extent would the erosion of tariff preferences, that necessarily 
accompanies MFN trade liberalization by developed countries, reduce the 
developing countries’ interest in agricultural and other trade reform? 
•  What should be done about agricultural export subsidies, including those implicit 
in export credits, food aid, and arrangements for state trading enterprises? 
•  Based on recent policy changes in key countries, how might domestic farm 
support measures be better disciplined in the WTO? 
•  What are the consequences of reducing the domestic support commitments made 
in the Uruguay Round, in terms of cuts to the actual domestic support levels 
currently provided to farmers? 
•  In particular, how might reductions in cotton subsidies help developing country 
farmers in West Africa and elsewhere? 
•  What difference does it make to expand market access for non-agricultural 
products at the same time as for farm goods under a Doha agreement? 
•  Which developing countries would have to reduce their farm output and 
employment as a result of such a Doha agreement? 
•  Taking a broad brush, and in the light of past experience and our understanding of 
the political economy of agricultural policies in rich and poor countries, how 
might reform of those policies best be progressed during the DDA negotiations?    8
•  What would be the overall market and welfare consequences by 2015, for various 
countries and regions as well as globally, of the alternative Doha reform 
commitments considered in addressing each of the above questions? 
 
What have we learned? 
 
  In addressing the above questions, the following are among the key messages that 
emerge from our study.  
The potential gains from further global trade reform are huge. Global gains 
from trade reform post-2004 are estimated to be large even if dynamic gains and gains 
from economies of scale and increased competition are ignored. Freeing all merchandise 
trade and agricultural subsidies is estimated to boost global welfare by nearly $300 
billion per year by 2015 (Table 3), plus whatever productivity effects that reform would 
generate.
5  
Developing countries could gain disproportionately from further global trade 
reform. The developing countries (as defined the WTO) would enjoy 45 percent of the 
global gain from complete liberalization of all merchandise trade, well above their share 
of global GDP. Their welfare would increase by 1.2 percent, compared with an increase 
of just 0.6 percent for developed countries. The developing countries’ higher share is 
partly because they have relatively high tariffs themselves (so they would reap substantial 
efficiency gains from reforming their own protection), and partly because their exports 
are more concentrated in farm and textile products whose tariffs in developed country 
markets are exceptionally high (Table 1) – notwithstanding non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences for many developing countries, which contribute to the losses associated with 
terms of trade deterioration shown in the middle column of Table 3.  
Benefits could be as much from South-South as from South-North trade 
reform. Trade reform by developing countries is just as important economically to those 
countries as is reform by developed countries, including from agricultural liberalization 
                                                 
5 There is strong evidence that trade reform in general is also good for economic growth and, partly because 
of that, for poverty alleviation (Winters 2004, Dollar and Kraay 2004, Winters, McCulloch and McKay 
2004).    9
(Table 4b). Hence choosing to delay their own reforms or reforming less than developed 
countries, and thereby holding back South-South trade growth, could reduce substantially 
the potential gains to developing countries. 
Agriculture is where cuts are needed most.  To realize that potential gain from 
opening up goods markets, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound tariffs 
and subsidies are required. This is because of the very high rates of assistance in that 
sector relative to other sectors. Food and agricultural policies are responsible for more 
than three-fifths of the global gain foregone because of merchandise trade distortions 
(column 1 of Table 4a) – despite the fact that agriculture and food processing account for 
less than 10 percent of world trade and less than 4 percent of global GDP. From the point 
of view of welfare of developing countries, agriculture is at least as important as it is for 
the world as a whole: their gains from global agricultural liberalization represent almost 
two-thirds of their total potential gains, which compares with just one-quarter from 
textiles and clothing and one-ninth from other merchandise liberalization (Table 4b).  
Subsidy disciplines are important, but increased market access in agriculture is 
crucial. Extremely high applied tariffs on agricultural relative to non-farm products are 
the major reason for food and agricultural policies contributing 63 percent of the welfare 
cost of current merchandise trade distortions. Subsidies to farm production and exports 
are only minor additional contributors: 3 and 1 percentage points respectively, compared 
with 59 points due to agricultural tariffs.
6 This is even truer for developing countries than 
for developed ones (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 5). Disciplining those domestic 
subsidies and phasing out export subsidies is nonetheless very important, so as to prevent 
re-instrumentation of assistance from tariffs to domestic subsidies and to bring 
agriculture into line with non-farm trade in terms of not using export subsidies. 
In developing countries the poor would gain most from multilateral trade 
reform. Full global merchandise trade liberalization would raise real factor returns for the 
poorest households most. This is implied in Table 6, where for developing countries the 
                                                 
6 This result is very similar to that reported from a partial equilibrium study by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga 
(2004). In our initial empirical analysis we also included crude estimates of implicit forms of farm export 
subsidization such as via food aid, export credits or state trading enterprises, but even that was not enough 
to raise that export subsidy share above 1 percent.    10
biggest factor price rise is for farm land, followed by unskilled labor. Since farmers and 
other low-skilled workers constitute the vast majority of the poor in developing countries, 
such reform would reduce both inequity and poverty.  
Large cuts in domestic support commitments are needed to erase binding 
overhang. In turning from the potential gains from full liberalization to what might be 
achievable under a Doha partial reform package, the devil is going to be in the details. 
For example, commitments on domestic support for farmers are so much higher than 
actual support levels at present that the 20 percent cut in the total bound AMS promised 
in the July Framework Agreement as an early installment will require no actual support 
reductions for any WTO member. Indeed a cut as huge as 75 percent for those with most 
domestic support is needed to get some action, and even then it would only require cuts 
in 2001 levels of domestic support for four WTO actors: the US (by 28 percent), the EU 
(by 18 percent), Norway (by 16 percent) and Australia by 10 percent – and the EU and 
Australia have already introduced reforms of that order since 2001, so may need to do no 
further cutting under even that formula.  
Large cuts in bound rates are needed also to erase binding overhang in 
agricultural tariffs.  Table 2 shows there is substantial binding overhang in agricultural 
tariffs: the average bound rate in developed countries is almost twice as high as the 
average applied rate, and in developing countries the ratio is even greater. Thus large 
reductions in bound rates are needed before it is possible to bring about any 
improvements in market access. To bring the global average actual agricultural tariff 
down by one-third, bound rates would have to be reduced for developed countries by at 
least 45 percent, and up to 75 percent for the highest tariffs, under a tiered formula.   
A complex tiered formula may be little better than a proportional tariff cut. It 
turns out that, because of the large binding overhang, a tiered formula for cutting 
agricultural tariffs would generate not much more global welfare – and no more welfare 
for developing countries as a group – than a proportional cut of the same average size 
(columns 1 and 2 of Tables 7, 8 and 9). This suggests there may be little value in arguing 
over the finer details of a complex tiered formula just for the sake of reducing tariff 
escalation. Instead, a simple tariff cap of, say, 100 or even 200 percent could achieve 
essentially the same outcome.    11
Even large cuts in bound tariffs do little if “Sensitive Products” are allowed, 
except if a cap applies. If members succumb to the political temptation to put limits on 
tariff cuts for the most sensitive farm products, much of the prospective gain from Doha 
could evaporate. Even if only 2 percent of HS6 agricultural tariff lines in developed 
countries are classified as sensitive (and 4 percent in developing countries, to incorporate 
also their “Special Products” request), and are thereby subject to just a 15 percent tariff 
cut (as a substitute for the TRQ expansion mentioned in the Framework Agreement), the 
welfare gains from global agricultural reform would shrink by three-quarters. However, if 
at the same time any product with a bound tariff in excess of 200 percent had to reduce it 
to that cap rate, the welfare gain would shrink by ‘only’ one-third (columns 3 and 4 of 
Tables 7, 8 and 9). 
  TRQ expansion could provide additional market access. Only a small number of 
farm products are subject to tariff rate quotas, but they protect over half of all developed 
countries’ production and 44 percent of their agricultural imports (de Gorter and Kliauga 
2005). Bringing down those products’ (out-of-quota) MFN bound tariff could be 
supplemented by lowering their in-quota tariff or expanding the size of the quota. While 
this may increase the aggregate rent attached to those quotas and hence resistance to 
eventually removing them, the extent of binding overhang is such that quota expansion 
may be the only way to get increased market access for TRQ products in the Doha round 
– especially if they are among the ones designated as ‘sensitive’ and hence subject to 
lesser cuts in their bound tariffs.  
High binding overhang means most developing countries would have to make 
few cuts. Given the high binding overhang of developing countries, even with their high 
tariffs – and even if tiered formulae are used to cut highest bindings most – relatively few 
of them would have to cut their actual tariffs and subsidies at all (Jean, Laborde and 
Martin 2005). That is even truer if “Special Products” are subjected to smaller cuts and 
developing countries exercise their right – as laid out in the July Framework Agreement – 
to undertake lesser cuts (zero in the case of LDCs) than developed countries. Politically 
this makes it easier for developing and least developed countries to offer big cuts on 
bound rates – but it also means the benefits to them are smaller than if they had a smaller 
binding overhang.    12
Cotton subsidy cuts would help cotton-exporting developing countries. The 
removal of cotton subsidies (which have raised producer prices by well over 50 percent in 
the US and EU – see Sumner 2005) would raise the export price of cotton (although not 
equally across all exporters because of product differentiation). If those subsidies were 
removed as part of freeing all merchandise trade, that price rise is estimated to be 8 
percent for Brazil but less for Sub-Saharan Africa on average. However, cotton exports 
from Sub-Saharan Africa would be a huge 75 percent larger, and the share of all 
developing countries in global exports would be 85 percent instead of 56 percent in 2015, 
vindicating those countries’ efforts to ensure cotton subsidies receive specific attention in 
the Doha negotiations. 
Expanding non-agricultural market access would add substantially to the gains 
from agricultural reform. Adding a 50 percent cut to non-agricultural tariffs by 
developed countries (and 33 percent by developing countries and zero by LDCs) to the 
tiered formula cut to agricultural tariffs would double the gain from Doha for developing 
countries (compare Scenarios 1 and 5 in Tables 7, 8 and 9). That would bring the global 
gain to $96 billion from Doha merchandise liberalization, which is a sizable one-third of 
the potential welfare gain from full liberalization of $287 billion. Adding services reform 
would of course boost that welfare gain even more.  
Adding non-agricultural tariff reform to agricultural reform helps to balance 
the exchange of “concessions”. The agricultural reforms would boost the annual value 
of world trade in 2015 by less than one-quarter what would happen if non-agricultural 
tariffs were also reduced. The latter’s inclusion also would help balance the exchange of 
“concessions” in terms of increases in bilateral trade values: in that case developing 
countries’ exports to high-income countries would then be $62 billion, which is close to 
the $55 billion increase in high-income countries’ exports to developing countries. With 
only agricultural reform, the latter’s bilateral trade growth would be little more than half 
the former’s (Table 10). 
Most developing countries gain, and the rest could if they reform more. Even 
though much of the DC gains from that comprehensive Doha scenario go to numerous 
large developing countries, notably Brazil, Argentina and Other Latin America plus 
India, Thailand and South Africa, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa gains too. This is    13
particularly so when developing countries participate as full partners in the negotiations. 
An important part of this result comes from the increases in market access – on a non-
discriminatory basis – by other developing countries. 
Preference erosion may be less of an issue than commonly assumed. Some least 
developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere appear to be slight losers in our 
Doha simulations when developed countries cut their tariffs and those LDCs choose not 
to reform at all themselves.
7 These simulations overstate the benefits of tariff preferences 
for LDCs, however, since they ignore the trade-dampening effect of complex rules of 
origin and the grabbing of much of the rents by developed-country importers. Even if 
they would lose after correcting for those realities, it remains true that preference-
receiving countries could always be compensated for preference erosion via increased aid 
at relatively very small cost to current preference providers – and in the process other 
developing countries currently hurt by LCD preferences would enjoy greater access to the 
markets of reforming developed countries. 
Farm output and employment would grow in developing countries under Doha. 
Despite a few low-income countries losing slightly under our Doha scenarios when they 
choose to reform little themselves, in all the developing countries and regions shown the 
levels of output and employment on farms expand. It is only in the most protected 
developed countries of Western Europe, Northeast Asia and the US that these levels 
would fall – and even there it is only by small amounts, contrary to the predictions of 
scaremongers who claim agriculture would be decimated in reforming countries (Table 
11). Even if there was a move to completely free merchandise trade, the developed 
countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural GDP by 2015 would be only slightly 
lower at 25 instead of 30 percent (but their share of global agricultural exports would be 
diminished considerably more: from 53 to 38 percent). 
Poverty could be reduced under Doha. Under the full merchandise trade 
liberalization scenario, extreme poverty in developing countries (those earning no more 
than $1/day) would drop by 32 million in 2015 relative to the baseline level of 
                                                 
7 As warned by Panagariya (2004) among others, some low-income countries’ terms of trade could 
deteriorate either because they would lose tariff preferences on their exports or because they are net food 
importers and so would face higher prices for their imports of temperate foods.    14
622 million, a reduction of 5 percent. The majority of the poor by 2015 are projected to 
be in Sub-Saharan Africa, and there the reduction would be 6 percent.
 8 Under the Doha 
scenarios reported in Table 12, the poverty impacts are far more modest. The number of 
poor living on less than $1/day would fall by 2.5 million in the case of the core Doha 
Scenario 5 (of which 0.5 million are in SSA) and by 6.3 million in the case of Doha 
Scenario 6 (of which 2.2 million are in SSA). This corresponds to the relatively modest 
ambitions of the merchandise trade reforms as captured in these Doha scenarios. If only 
agriculture was reformed (Doha Scenario 1) there would be much less poverty alleviation 
globally and none at all in SSA. This shows the importance for poverty of including 
manufactured products in the Doha negotiations. 
Developing countries could trade off Special and Differential Treatment for 
more market access.  If developing countries were to tone down their call for Special and 
Differential Treatment (see Josling 2005), in terms of wanting smaller cuts and longer 
phase-in periods, reciprocity means they could expect bigger tariff and subsidy cuts from 
developed countries. Similarly, if they were to forego their call for lesser cuts for 
“Special Products”, they could demand that developed countries forego their call for 
some “Sensitive Products” to be subject to smaller tariff cuts. A comparison of Scenarios 
5 and 6 in Tables 7, 8 and 9 shows that the economic payoffs for low-income countries 
even if high-income countries do not reciprocate with larger offers is considerable. 
Moreover, by embracing those options to reform more in the context of the Doha round 
                                                 
8 The approach here has been to take the change in the average per capita consumption of the poor, apply 
an estimated income-to-poverty elasticity, and assess the impacts on the poverty headcount index. We have 
done this by calculating the change in the real wage of unskilled workers, deflating it by a food/clothing 
consumer price index which is more relevant for the poor than the total price index. That real wage grows, 
over all developing countries, by 3.6 percent, or more than four times greater than the overall average 
income increase. We are assuming that the change in unskilled wages is fully passed through to 
households. Also, while the model closure has the loss in tariff revenues replaced by a change in direct 
household taxation, the poverty calculation assumes – realistically for many developing countries -- that 
these tax increases only affect skilled workers and high-income households. While these simple 
calculations are not a substitute for more-detailed individual country case study analysis using detailed 
household surveys as in, for example, Hertel and Winters (2005), they are able to give a broad region-wide 
indication of the poverty impact.    15
would make it harder for high-income countries to resist the call to respond with larger 
reforms themselves.  
 
Key policy implications 
 
  Among the numerous policy implications that can be drawn from the above 
findings, the following are worth highlighting. 
  Prospective gains are too large to not find the needed political will to make 
Doha a success. With gains of the order of $300 billion per year at stake from 
implementing the July Framework Agreement (even if no reforms are forthcoming in 
services and if the counterfactual would be the status quo rather than protectionist 
backsliding), the political will needs to be found to bring the round to a successful 
conclusion, and the sooner the better. Multilateral cuts in MFN bindings are helpful also 
because they can lock in previous unilateral trade liberalizations that otherwise would 
remain unbound and hence be vulnerable to backsliding; and they can be used as an 
opportunity to multilateralize previously agreed preferential trade agreements and thereby 
reduce the risk of trade diversion from those bilateral or regional arrangements (as 
stressed in Sutherland 2004). 
  Since developed countries would gain most, and have the most capacity and 
influence, they need to show leadership at the WTO. The large developed countries 
cannot generate a successful agreement on their own, but nor can the Doha round succeed 
without a major push by those key traders. Their capacity to assist poorer economies 
could hardly manifest itself more clearly than in encouraging global economic integration 
via trade reform, and in particular in opening developed country markets to the items of 
greatest importance to poorer countries, namely farm (and textile) products. The more 
that is done, the more developing countries will be encouraged to reciprocate by opening 
their own markets more – accelerating South-South trade in addition to South-North 
trade. 
  Outlawing agricultural export subsidies is the obvious first step. That will bring 
agriculture into line with the basic GATT rule against such measures, and in the process 
help to limit the extent to which governments encourage agricultural production by other    16
means (since it would raise the cost of surplus disposal). China has already committed 
not to use them, and other developing countries too can find more-efficient ways of 
stabilizing their domestic food markets than by dumping surpluses abroad.  
  Even more importantly, agricultural tariff and domestic support bindings must 
be cut hugely to remove binding overhang and provide some genuine market opening. 
Getting rid of the binding overhang that resulted from the Uruguay Round, particularly 
with ‘dirty tariffication’, must be a priority.
9 The highest-subsidizing countries, namely 
the EU, US and Norway, need to reduce their domestic support not just for the sake of 
their own economies but also to encourage developing countries to reciprocate by 
opening their markets as a quid pro quo. But more than that is needed if market access is 
to expand. If a choice had to be made, reducing MFN bound tariffs in general would be 
preferable to raising tariff rate quotas, because the latter help only those lucky enough to 
obtain quotas and crowd out non-quota holders. (Being against the non-discrimination 
spirit of the GATT, they deserve the same fate as textile quotas which were abolished at 
the end of 2004.) Exempting even just a few Sensitive and Special Products is 
undesirable as it would reduce hugely the gains from reform and would tend to divert 
resources into, instead of away from, enterprises in which countries have their least 
comparative advantage. If it turns out to be politically impossible not to designate some 
Sensitive and Special Products, it would be crucial to impose a cap such that any product 
with a bound tariff in excess of, say, 100 percent had to reduce it to that cap rate. 
  Expanding non-agricultural market access at the same time as reforming 
agriculture is essential. A balanced exchange of concession is impossible without adding 
other sectors, and it needs to be more than just textiles and clothing (which also benefit 
developing countries disproportionately) even though they are the other highly distorted 
sector. With other merchandise included, the trade expansion would be four times greater 
for both rich and poor countries – and poverty in low-income countries would be reduced 
considerably more. 
  South-South “concessions” also are needed, especially for developing countries, 
which means reconsidering the opportunity for developing countries to liberalize less. 
                                                 
9 As Francois and Martin (2004) have shown, any binding cut is useful for the long run even if it brings no 
immediate cut in applied rates.    17
Since developing countries are trading so much more with each other now, they are the 
major beneficiaries of reforms within their own regions. Upper middle-income countries 
might consider giving least developed countries duty-free access to their markets 
(mirroring the recent initiatives of developed countries), but better than such 
discriminatory action would be MFN tariff reductions by them. Even least developed 
countries should consider reducing their tariff binding overhang at least, since doing that 
in the context of Doha gives them more scope to demand “concessions” (or compensation 
for preference erosion or other contributors to terms of trade deterioration) from richer 




The good news in this paper is that there is a great deal to be gained from 
liberalizing merchandise – and especially agricultural – trade under Doha, with a 
disproportionately high share of that potential gain available for developing countries 
(relative to their share of the global economy). Moreover, it is the poorest people in 
developing countries that appear to be most likely to gain from global trade liberalization, 
namely farmers and unskilled laborers in developing countries. To realize that potential 
gain, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound tariffs and subsidies are 
required. However, the political sensitivity of farm support programs, coupled with the 
complexities of the measures introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture and of the modalities set out in the Doha Framework Agreement of July 
2004, ensure the devil will be in the details of the final Doha agreement. It is for that 
reason that ex ante empirical analysis of the sort provided in the study summarized above 
is a prerequisite for countries engaged in the Doha round of negotiations. 
What emerges from our analysis is that developing countries would not have to 
reform very much under Doha, because of the large gaps between their tariff bindings 
and applied rates. That is even truer if they exercise their right (as laid out in the July 
Framework Agreement) to undertake lesser tariff cuts than developed countries. In that 
case, they gain little in terms of improved efficiency of national resource use. Yet, as 
Panagariya (2004) and others have warned, for a non-trivial number of low-income    18
countries their terms of trade could deteriorate, as shown in Table 3. For some that is 
because they would lose tariff preferences on their exports. For others it is because they 
are net food importers and so would face higher prices for their imports of temperate 
foods. To realize more of their potential gains from trade, developing and least developed 
countries would need to forego some of the Special and Differential Treatment they have 
previously demanded, and perhaps also commit to additional unilateral trade (and 
complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade facilitation. High-income 
countries could encourage them to do so by being willing to open up their own markets 
more to developing country exports,
10 and by providing more targeted aid. To that end, a 
new proposal has been put forward to reward developing country commitments to greater 
trade reform with an expansion of trade-facilitating aid, to be provided by a major 
expansion of the current Integrated Framework which is operated by a consortium of 
international agencies for least developed countries (Hoekman 2005a,b). This may well 
provide an attractive path for developing countries seeking to trade their way out of 
poverty, not least because linking aid to greater trade reform would help offset the 
tendency for an expanded aid flow to cause a real exchange rate appreciation (see 
Commission for Africa 2005, pp. 296-97). As well, it is potentially a far more efficient 
way for developed countries to assist people in low-income countries than the current 
systems of tariff preferences. 
In conclusion, the July Framework Agreement does not guarantee major gains 
from the Doha Development Agenda. On the one hand, even if an agreement is ultimately 
reached, it may be very modest. How modest depends on, among other things, the nature 
of the agricultural tariff-cutting formula, the size of the cuts, the extent to which 
exceptions for Sensitive and Special Products are allowed, whether a tariff cap is 
introduced, and the extent to which Special and Differential Treatment is invoked by 
developing countries in terms of their market access commitments. But what is equally 
                                                 
10 Limao and Olarreago (2005) suggest preference erosion could be addressed by replacing the current 
margin of preference with an equivalent import subsidy for products from preference-receiving countries, 
thereby retaining the preference status quo while taking away this reason not to undertake most-favored-
nation tariff cuts.     19
clear, on the other hand, is that major gains are possible if only the political will to reform 
protectionist policies – especially in agriculture – can be mustered.    20
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Figure 1: The declining share of agriculture and food in world and developing
a 
countries’ merchandise exports, 1970 to 2003  
(percent) 
 
a Developing countries here do not include East Asia’s newly-industrialized economies of 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
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Figure 2: Agricultural producer support in high-income countries, by value, percent 
and type of support, 1986 to 2003 
 








Source: PSE estimates from the OECD’s database (see www.oecd.org)    27
 
Figure 3: Agricultural producer support in high-income countries, by country, 1986 
to 2003 
 




1 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovac Republic data are for 1991-93 in the 
first period. 
2 Austria, Finland and Sweden are included in the OECD average for both periods but 
also in the EU average for the latter period. 
 
Source: PSE estimates from the OECD’s database (see www.oecd.org)    28
Table 1: Average applied import tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 
 















    
  Agriculture and food   
   
High-income countries
b  18 18 17.8 
Developing countries
a  14 18 15.6 
All countries  16 18 16.7 
  Textiles and wearing apparel 
   
   
High-income countries
b  8 15 12.0 
Developing countries
a  7 20 9.3 
All countries  8 17 10.2 
  Other manufactures 
   
   
High-income countries
b  2 9 4.1 
Developing countries
a  1 7 2.5 
All countries  1 8 3.5 
 
  All merchandise   
   
High-income countries
b  3 10 5.4 
Developing countries
a  3 10 4.9 
All countries  3 10 5.2 
 
 
a These import-weighted averages incorporate tariff preferences provided to developing 
countries, unlike earlier versions of the GTAP database. They assume the EU is a single 
customs territory. 
 
b High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies 
that joined the EU in April 2004. 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.2)   29
Table 2: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(percent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
  





      
Developed countries  27  22  14 
Developing countries  48  27  21 
    of which: LDCs  78 14  13 
WORLD 37  24  17 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem 
equivalent of specific tariffs. Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies 
that joined the EU in April 2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that 
adopted by the WTO and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized tiger 
economies, which is why the 21 percent shown in column 3 is above the 18 and 14 
percent shown in the first column of Table 1. 
 
Source: Jean, Laborde and Martin (2005, Table 4.2)    30
Table 3: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise 
trade, by country/region, 2015 

















     
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  1.0 
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  0.5  0.6 
United States  16.2  10.7  0.1 
Canada  3.8  -0.3  0.4 
Japan  54.6  7.5  1.1 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  3.5 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  7.9  2.6 
Argentina  4.9 1.2 1.2 
Bangladesh  0.1 -1.1  0.2 
Brazil  9.9 4.6 1.5 
China  5.6 -8.3  0.2 
India  3.4 -9.4  0.4 
Indonesia  1.9 0.2 0.7 
Thailand  7.7 0.7 3.8 
Vietnam  3.0 -0.2  5.2 
Russia  2.7 -2.7  0.6 
Mexico  3.6 -3.6  0.4 
South Africa  1.3 0.0 0.9 
Turkey  3.3 0.2 1.3 
Rest of South Asia  1.0  -0.8  0.5 
Rest of East Asia  5.3  -0.9  1.9 
Rest of LAC  10.3  0.0  1.2 
Rest of ECA  1.0  -1.6  0.3 
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  1.2 
Selected SSA countries  1.0  0.5  1.5 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.3  1.1 
Rest of the World  3.4  0.1  1.5 
High-income countries  201.6 30.3  0.6 
Developing countries--WTO definition  141.5 -21.4  1.2 
     Low- and middle-income countries  85.7 -29.7  0.8 
     Middle-income countries  69.5 -16.7  0.8 
     Low-income countries  16.2 -12.9  0.8 
     East Asia and Pacific  23.5  -8.5  0.7 
     South Asia  4.5  -11.2  0.4 
     Europe and Central Asia  7.0  -4.0  0.7 
     Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  1.2 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8  -1.8  1.1 
     Latin America and the Caribbean  28.7  2.2  1.0 
World total  287.3  0.6  0.7 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.4)    31
Table 4: Effects on economic welfare of full trade liberalization from different 




(a) Distribution of effects on global welfare 
 
 


























17 8  20  45 
ALL COUNTRIES’ 
POLICIES 
63 14  23  100 
 
 
(b) Distribution of effects on developing countries’ welfare 
 
 


























33 10  7 50 
ALL COUNTRIES’ 
POLICIES 
63 27  10  100 
 
a Developed countries include the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.6). 
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Table 5: Distribution of global welfare impacts of fully removing agricultural tariffs 
















   
        Import market access  66 27 93 
        Export subsidies  5 -3 2 
        Domestic support  4 1 5 
       All measures 
  75 25 100 
 
 
a High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition 
economies that joined the EU in April 2004. 
 
Source: Summarized from Hertel and Keeney (2005a, Table 2.7)    33
 
Table 6: Impacts of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real factor prices, 2015
a 
(Percent change relative to the baseline in 2015) 
 










       
Australia and New Zealand  3.1 1.1  -0.3  17.2 1.2 
EU 25 plus EFTA  0.0 1.3 0.7  -51.0  -1.3 
United States  0.1 0.3 0.0  -9.2  -0.4 
Canada  0.7 0.7 0.4  26.9  -0.9 
Japan  1.3 2.2 1.1  -67.2  -0.1 
Korea and Taiwan  6.5 7.1 3.8  -45.0  -0.7 
Hong Kong and Singapore  3.2 1.6 0.3 4.4 1.1 
Argentina  2.9 0.5  -0.7  21.3 0.3 
Bangladesh  1.8 1.7  -0.2 1.8  -7.2 
Brazil  2.7 1.4 1.6  32.4 2.2 
China  2.2 2.2 2.8  -0.9  -0.4 
India  2.8 4.6 1.8  -2.6  -6.0 
Indonesia  3.3 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.5 
Thailand  13.2 6.7 4.2  11.4  -0.6 
Vietnam  25.3 17.6 11.0  6.8 -2.3 
Russia  2.0 2.8 3.5  -2.2  -3.3 
Mexico  2.0 1.6 0.5 0.6  -1.4 
South Africa  2.8 2.5 1.8 5.7  -1.6 
Turkey  1.3 3.4 1.1  -8.1  -0.3 
Rest of South Asia  3.7 3.2 0.1 0.1  -2.7 
Rest of East Asia  5.8 4.2 5.2  -0.9  -1.6 
Rest of Latin America & Car  5.7  1.4 -0.4 17.8 -1.2 
Rest of E. Europe & C. Asia  2.3 4.2 2.1  -0.3  -2.6 
Middle East & North Africa  4.1 4.1 2.6 2.4  -3.1 
Other Southern Africa  6.0 1.6 0.0 4.6 0.4 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  8.2 6.5 2.2 5.2  -5.0 
Rest of the World  4.4 2.7 1.1 6.3  -1.4 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.10)  
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Table 7: Welfare effects of possible Doha reform scenarios, 2015 
 
(percent difference from baseline, and Equivalent Variation in income in 2001 $billion) 




























  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
 
High-income
e countries  0.20 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.30
 
Middle-income countries  0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.21
   of which: China  -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.06
 
Low-income countries  0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.30
 
TOTAL WORLD  0.18 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28
 (and in $billion)  74.5 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1 119.3
a Elimination of agricultural export subsidies and cuts in actual domestic support as of 2001 of 28 percent in the US, 18 percent in the 
EU, and 16 percent in Norway. 
b In Scenarios 1 and 2 the applied global average tariff on agricultural products is cut by roughly one-third, with larger cuts in 
developed countries, smaller in developing countries, and zero in least developed countries. In Scenario 1 there are three tiers 
for developed countries and four for developing countries, following Harbinson (WTO 2003) but 10 percentage points higher.  
c Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) is expanded by a 50 percent tariff cut for developed countries, 33 percent for developing 
countries, and zero in least developed countries. 
d Developing and least developed countries cut all agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs as much as developed countries. 
e High-income countries (HICs) include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU in April 2004. 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.14)  
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Table 8: Dollar change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(change in real income in 2015 in 2001 $billion compared to baseline scenario) 
  
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4  Scen. 5  Scen. 6
Australia & New Zealand  2.0      2.2  1.2  1.2  2.4  2.8 
EU 25 plus EFTA  29.5      28.2  10.7  10.9  31.4  35.7 
United States  3.0      3.4  2.5  2.1  4.9  6.6 
Canada  1.4      1.2  0.4  0.4  0.9  1.0 
Japan  18.9      15.1  1.4  12.9  23.7  25.4 
Korea and Taiwan  10.9      7.3  1.7  15.9  15.0  22.6 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1      -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  1.5  2.2 
Argentina  1.3     1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.6 
Bangladesh  0.0     0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Brazil  3.3     3.2 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9 
China  -0.5     -0.4 -1.4 -1.1  1.7  1.6 
India  0.2     0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5 
Indonesia  0.1     0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2 
Thailand  0.9     1.0 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.7 
Vietnam  -0.1     -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 
Russia  -0.3     -0.1 -0.7 -0.7  0.8  1.5 
Mexico  -0.2     -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
South  Africa  0.1     0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Turkey  0.6     0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.4 
Rest of South Asia  0.2      0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.7 
Rest of East Asia  0.1      0.1  0.1  1.0  0.3  0.6 
Rest of Latin America & the Carib.  3.7      3.7  0.5  0.4  3.9  4.0 
Rest of E. Europe and Central Asia  -0.2      -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6  -0.7 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.8      -0.9  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1 
Other Southern Africa  0.1      0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0      0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.3 
Rest of the World  0.4      0.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6 
High-income  countries  65.6     57.2 17.8 43.2 79.9 96.4 
Developing  countries  9.0     9.1 0.1 1.1  16.1  22.9 
     Middle-income countries  8.0      8.3  0.0  1.0  12.5  17.1 
     Low-income countries  1.0      0.8  0.2  0.0  3.6  5.9 
     East Asia and Pacific  0.5      0.9  -0.4  0.6  4.5  5.5 
     South Asia  0.4      0.3  0.3  0.4  2.5  4.2 
     Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.1      0.2  -0.9  -0.9  0.8  2.1 
     Middle East and North Africa  -0.8      -0.9  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3      0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  1.2 
     Latin America & the Caribbean  8.1      8.0  2.5  2.1  7.9  9.2 
World  total  74.5     66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1  119.3 
 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.14) 
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Table 9: Percentage change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(change in real income in 2015 in percent compared to baseline scenario) 
  
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4  Scen. 5  Scen. 6
Australia & New Zealand  0.35      0.38  0.22  0.20  0.42  0.48 
EU 25 plus EFTA  0.29      0.28  0.11  0.11  0.31  0.36 
United States  0.02      0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.05 
Canada  0.15      0.13  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.11 
Japan  0.38      0.30  0.03  0.26  0.48  0.51 
Korea and Taiwan  0.86      0.58  0.14  1.26  1.19  1.79 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.02      -0.02  -0.04  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
Argentina  0.32     0.34 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh  -0.06     -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil  0.50     0.49 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.59 
China  -0.02     -0.01 -0.05 -0.04  0.07  0.06 
India  0.02     0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia  0.05     0.08 0.09 0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand  0.43     0.49 0.38 0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam  -0.20     -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia  -0.06     -0.03 -0.15 -0.15  0.16  0.31 
Mexico  -0.02     -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South  Africa  0.06     0.09 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey  0.25     0.22 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.55 
Rest of South Asia  0.13      0.11  0.06  0.14  0.17  0.39 
Rest of East Asia  0.02      0.05  0.04  0.36  0.09  0.22 
Rest of Latin America & the Carib.  0.44      0.43  0.06  0.04  0.46  0.47 
Rest of E. Europe and Central Asia  -0.06      -0.06  -0.09  -0.08  -0.22  -0.26 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.07      -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
Other Southern Africa  0.21      0.19  -0.03  -0.05  0.19  0.26 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.02      0.01  -0.14  -0.14  -0.02  0.13 
Rest of the World  0.19      0.14  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.28 
High-income  countries  0.20     0.18 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.30 
Developing  countries  0.09     0.09 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.22 
     Middle-income countries  0.10      0.10  0.00  0.01  0.15  0.21 
     Low-income countries  0.05      0.04  0.01  0.00  0.18  0.30 
     East Asia and Pacific  0.01      0.03  -0.01  0.02  0.13  0.16 
     South Asia  0.03      0.02  0.03  0.03  0.21  0.36 
     Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.01      0.02  -0.09  -0.09  0.08  0.21 
     Middle East and North Africa  -0.07      -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  0.06      0.06  -0.04  -0.02  0.10  0.27 
     Latin America & the Caribbean  0.29      0.29  0.09  0.08  0.29  0.33 
World  total  0.18     0.16 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28 
 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.14) 
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Table 10: Effects on bilateral merchandise trade flows of adding non-agricultural 
tariff cuts to agricultural reform under Doha, 2015 
 




                                                                         
  Propn’l agric reform only














   
Exports from :   
High-income
c countries  20 11 80  55
  
Developing countries  18 5 62  16
  
TOTAL WORLD  38 16 142 71
    
 
 
a Scenario 2 in Table 7 
 
b Scenario 5 in Table 7 
 
e High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition 
economies that joined the EU in April 2004. 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.16)  
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Table 11: Effects of a comprehensive Doha reform on agricultural output and 
employment growth, by region, 2005 to 2015 
 
(annual average growth rate, percent) 
 
                         Output                             Employment
 
Baseline  Scenario 5
b  Baseline  Scenario 5
b 
       
Australia and New Zealand  3.5  4.3  0.4  1.0 
Canada 3.5  4.0  0.2  0.6 
United States  2.2  1.9  -0.8  -1.4 
EU 25 plus EFTA  1.0  -0.3  -1.8  -2.8 
Japan 0.5  -1.4  -2.7  -4.1 
Korea and Taiwan  2.2  1.5  -1.3  -2.1 
        
Argentina 2.9  3.5  0.9  1.5 
Bangladesh 4.2  4.2  1.1  1.2 
Brazil 3.3  4.4  1.1  2.2 
China 4.3  4.3  0.8  0.8 
India 4.3  4.4  1.0  1.0 
Indonesia 3.0  3.0  -0.7  -0.6 
Thailand -0.1  0.4  -4.6  -4.3 
Vietnam 5.8  5.9  3.9  4.0 
Russia 1.5  1.4  -2.3  -2.4 
Mexico 3.9  4.0  2.0  2.3 
South Africa  2.5  2.6  0.0  0.1 
Turkey 3.0  3.0  -0.5  -0.5 
Rest of South Asia  4.8  4.9  2.0  2.1 
Rest of East Asia  3.7  3.8  0.2  0.3 
Rest of Latin America & Ca  4.4  5.3  1.9  2.6 
Rest of E. Europe & C. Asia  3.3  3.3  0.0  0.0 
Middle East & North Africa  4.0  4.0  1.5  1.5 
Other Southern Africa  5.3  5.4  3.0  3.0 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  4.6  4.8  2.2  2.3 
Rest of the World  5.0  5.5  2.4  2.7 
 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.17)  
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Table 12: Changes in poverty ( those earning <$1/day) in alternative Doha scenarios compared 
with full liberalization, 2015  
                   
   
Full liberalization 




share      
Doha 
Scenario 1   
Doha 
Scenario 5   
Doha 
Scenario 6   
                   
2015 Headcount (%)                          
East Asia & Pacific  0.9    0.8    0.9    0.9    0.9   
Latin America & Carib.  6.9    6.6    6.9    6.9    6.8   
South Asia  12.8    12.5    12.8    12.7    12.6   
Sub-Saharan Africa  38.4    36.0    38.4    38.3    38.1   
All developing 
countries  10.2   9.7    10.2    10.2    10.1   
                   
                   
2015 Headcount (mill.)  
2015 
level 
Decrease from baseline 
(in millions)  Decrease from baseline (in millions) 
East Asia & Pacific  19    2.2    0.1    0.3    0.5   
Latin America & Carib.  43    2.1    0.3    0.4    0.5   
South  Asia  216    5.6  0.2    1.4    3.0   
Sub-Saharan Africa  340    21.1    -0.1    0.5    2.2   
All developing 
countries  622    31.9  0.5    2.5    6.3   
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations as reported in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005c, 
Table 17.7). 
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